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Abstract: The Chinese government and its companies have dramatically increased their 
presence in Africa in the last decade. There has been much media interest and 
commentary on the impacts of China on governance in Africa, as it is often seen to be 
strengthening authoritarian states such Sudan and Zimbabwe (Arrighi 2007). However, 
China is also engaging with more democratic states and spaces, such as Zambia. This 
paper seeks to explore the impacts of China’s increased engagement with Africa on 
governance through a comparative case study of two contrasting cases: Sudan and 
Zambia, using the concept of flexigemony. Contrary to popular perception, China has 
sometimes been a moderating force in Sudan, while provoking violence in Zambia.  
 
China’s rapid economic expansion over the past three decades has attracted increasing 
academic, media and government attention. As China has moved from being an exporter 
of raw materials and minerals to a large-scale importer, its global resource diplomacy has 
attracted particular interest; it now consumes one third of global steel output, 40% of 
cement and 26% of the world’s copper. Crucially, China’s trade with developing 
countries grew 88% faster than its trade with developed ones from 1999 to 2003 
(Eisenman, Heginbotham et al. 2008). However, relatively little critical, analytical and 
systematic case-study based work has analysed the governance implications of this 
phenomenon.  
  Recent influential books identify China’s rise as of epochal and global 
significance (see Arrighi, 2007; Kurlantzick, 2007). However, this paper argues that 
characterizations of China’s global resource diplomacy as a form of Nyeian “soft power”, 
a la Kurlantzick, are problematic for a variety of reasons. For instance, it is not at all 
clear that China’s global resource diplomacy relies solely on “soft power”, as allies often 
receive military equipment training and support; sometimes used to deadly effect, as in 
Sudan. The Chinese state certainly does not shy away from engaging with autocratic 
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rule is dependent on economic growth and accumulation for regime legitimisation it is 
authoritarian, and consequently a “no questions asked policy” is adopted towards 
suppliers of critical natural resources, underpinned by mercantilism, that ironically makes 
it a ‘purer’ form of a capitalist state than the US, for example. As an authoritarian state 
itself, China seems to find relations with other authoritarian states, which keep 
themselves closer to China, less problematic than with more democratic states. 
Through two African-based case studies of Sudan and Zambia, this article seeks 
to reframe the debate on China’s governance impact in Africa. We characterise China’s 
resource or geo-economic strategy in Africa as being embodied by different strands of 
engagement and modes of governance: clientelism, proxy force and hegemony. Together 
these constitute an incipient new form of what we term “flexigemony”, whereby Chinese 
actors adapt their strategies geographically to suit the particular histories and geographies 
of the African states with which they engage. This new configuration, of course, is 
unstable and has its own internal contradictions, which emerge in different spatial 
contexts. For example, in Sudan the Chinese government has recently been active in 
attempting to broker a peace deal in Darfur, whereas in previously peaceful Zambia, 
increased Chinese investment and migration has generated riots, strikes and shootings. 
The apparent contrast between war-torn Sudan and “peaceful” Zambia is then 
interrogated to show how greater Chinese investment in resource extraction has led to 
outbreaks of, or a renewal of, violence in both cases. Chinese strategies of engagement 
then are informed by the necessity to moderate the impacts of resource-based capital 
accumulation, which in other contexts has generated “ungovernability” (Watts 2007). 
 
“Soft Power” or Flexigemony: Strategy for an Emerging Presence in Africa 
With the end of the Cold War, the USA appeared as the world’s dominant power, 
militarily, if not economically. In concert with its European allies, it promoted through 
the international financial institutions and through its bilateral diplomacy and aid 
programmes a particular neoliberal normalizing vision of what constituted “good 
governance” in African states. The details of its modalities have been described 
elsewhere in detail (Craig and Porter 2006). The model essentially comprised a free 
  2market economy and liberal democratic polity. This hegemonic geopolitical and 
economic vision was informed by both material interests and ideals. A free market 
economy allowed for penetration by Western capital and continued resource exportation, 
while liberal democracy was seen to prevent “excessive” government intervention in the 
economy (Joseph, 1999). While the Western powers had supported brutal autocrats, such 
as Mobutu in Zaire, during the Cold War as anti-communist bulwarks, during the 1990s 
their supposed ‘natural preference for democracy’ reasserted itself (Sandbrook 1993). 
While this Western reform programme encountered limited acceptance and also 
resistance (Van de Walle 2001), its overall impacts were to reinscribe Western 
dominance on the continent. This presented a challenge for Chinese actors in asserting 
their presence and influence (and securing resource access) as the 2000s progressed.  
  In Western media accounts China’s “march into Africa” is often presented as a 
threat to both Western interests and African populations (Mawdsley 2008). However, 
China’s trade with Africa accounts for only 3% of its total international trade and its 
expansion in Africa is part of its broader global expansion (Kurlantzick, 2007). 
Nonetheless, Africa is perhaps more important than suggested by the global trade 
statistics, with Angola being China’s single largest supplier of oil in some years. While 
the US imports only 19% of it oil from Africa, the figure for China is 31%, making it of 
far greater strategic importance for that country (Taylor 2009). For Africa’s part, Chinese 
involvement in Africa is arguably the most momentous development on the continent 
since the end of the Cold War. 
  According to Tony Blair (2008), over the course of the last few years China has 
gone from a ‘standing start’ to being the most influential country on the continent (Blair 
2008). Kurlantzick (2007: xi) attributes this to the fact that ‘in a short period of time, 
China appears to have created a systematic, coherent soft power strategy, and a set of 
power tools to implement that strategy’. Kurlantzick then goes on to assert however that 
“soft power” for the Chinese is different as ‘it means anything outside of the military and 
security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more 
coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in 
multilateral organizations’ (p. 6). The basis for this exceptionalism, or who is defining 
soft power in this way is left unexplained. Rather, it would appear that the Chinese use, 
  3for the most part, hard economic power softly. This more closely approximates Joseph 
Nye’s more recent formulation of “smart power” (Nye 2008). However, China has also 
been willing to use its military technology and capabilities in Africa, through arming 
clients, such as Sudan. Hence we argue that the concept of flexigemony is better suited to 
understand the way in which the Chinese have emerged from “under the radar” to 
become, arguably, some of the most powerful actors on the African continent.  
  China’s strategy has been guided by the philosophy of heping juequi or peaceful 
rise. This is perhaps the only option for China to seek space in the international system, 
given the overwhelming preponderance of American military force, as the US now 
spends 45% of the world’s total military spending (Stockholm Peace Research Institute 
2005). According to the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jibao, the country’s ascent in the 
international hierarchy would ‘not come at the cost of any other country, will not stand in 
the way of any other country, nor pose a threat to any other country’ (quoted in 
Kurlantzick, 2007: 38). This pragmatic approach sought then not to transform other 
countries in the model of China (contra the neoconservative vision in the US) but rather 
work through and with existing social relations and formations. Whereas neoliberal 
“virtualism” (Carrier and Miller 1998) sought to make the real world of existing social 
relations conform to the ideal, Chinese interests dictate a more bottom-up approach, using 
existing, and creating new, networks of influence.  
One of the reasons why state elites have so eagerly received the Chinese in Africa 
is that their involvement supports prevailing distributions of power and patterns of 
neopatrimonial governance (Clapham 2007). Thus, paradoxically while seeking to 
displace Western “hegemonism” China is, in part, a status quo power in terms of 
domestic governance patterns and modalities in Africa (Taylor 2007). Whereas former 
President of the World Bank James Wolfensohn (1998, 11, quoted in Slater 2004) argued 
that in today’s global economy it was “the totality of change in a country that matters” 
(original emphasis), the Chinese government is very much less prescriptive about 
domestic governance (and disorder) arrangements and has shown itself to work with and 
through both highly authoritarian states, such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, and more 
democratic polities and spaces such as Zambia.  
  4Rather than seeking a societal transformation, which is unlikely to be achieved in 
any event, the Chinese focus on two core aims: natural resource exports and expansion of 
recognition for the one China policy. There are of course other subsidiary motivations 
and dimensions to Chinese geoeconomic and geopolitical strategy in Africa, which have 
been described elsewhere (Carmody and Owusu 2007).  
  The key elements of Chinese flexigemony in Africa might be summarized as:  
•  In line with the global regime of flexible accumulation (Harvey, 1989) and 
Beijing’s “go global” or “go out” policy for its companies, announced in 2003, it 
prioritizes the economic over political and security concerns.  
•  It uses a combination of economic, political and military levers in flexible 
strategic combinations to ensure continued raw material supplies.  
•  It does not use direct military force to secure interests, but rather proxy sub-
contracting and the use of direct economic power.  
•  It is domestic and international sovereignty-strengthening for partner states: that is 
to say it is not normalizing, but works through extant institutions and diverse 
state-society formations.  
•  It is reinforced by frequent high-level state visits as a form of public diplomacy 
and to build inter-state trust in line with the Five Principles discussed later 
(political “coming out”, as a compliment to economic “going out”). 
 
We aim to demonstrate the above with reference to two case studies in Africa.  
 
Chinese and Sudan: Obstruction, But Also Evolution  
Chinese companies are now Sudan’s largest investors and according to a study by PFC 
Strategic Studies, the Sudanese government could collect as much as $30 billion or more 
in total oil revenue by 2012 (Washington Post, December 23, 2004). The bulk of this will 
come from Chinese-operated oil wells; China currently imports 60 percent of Sudan’s oil 
output. Given the extent of Chinese sunk costs in Sudan, it is arguably over an (oil) barrel 
in its dealings with Khartoum. Indeed, Beijing’s relationship with Khartoum has become 
a major cause célèbre and the campaign to link Chinese support for Khartoum and what 
is going on in Darfur with the 2008 Beijing Olympics was perhaps the most public 
  5manifestation of this. In turn, a full-scale foreign policy to play up China’s contribution to 
conflict resolution in Africa took place in response.  
Analysis of the conflict in Darfur has been covered in depth elsewhere: suffice to 
say that the UN Security Council has been involved in trying to find a resolution to the 
crisis. For a long time, China sought to hamper or undermine such efforts. However, this 
has somewhat changed in recent years as Chinese flexigemony has developed. Indeed, 
Beijing’s obstructionist policy began to tentatively shift from 2005 onwards. For instance, 
the Security Council passed three key Resolutions in March 2005, where ‘the Chinese 
representative [began to strike] a more conciliatory tone and showed willingness to 
discuss the resolutions provided that the integrity of the country [Sudan] would be 
guaranteed’ (New Vision [Kampala], June 16, 2007). Resolution 1593 (adopted on March 
31, 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The 
resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorizing the coercive 
measures for non-compliance. China abstained, but noted that it ‘believed that the 
perpetrators must be brought to justice’. Interestingly, this did not please Khartoum as the 
Sudanese second vice president Ali Osman Mohamed Taha had told Sudan’s cabinet he 
had had Chinese assurances the resolution would not be passed (Reuters [Khartoum], 
December 17, 2005). China’s ‘abstention rather than a veto embarrassed Taha within the 
government’ and ‘the crowd following the ICC referral criticized China for not blocking 
the resolution’ (Sudan Tribune [Paris], January 15, 2007). 
However, Beijing’s overall position of either abstaining from UN Resolutions or 
seeking to water them down provoked a grass-roots movement, primarily in the United 
States, that called for a campaign to highlight China’s complicity in the conflict in 
Darfur. This was then directly linked to Beijing’s hosting of the 2008 Olympics, with 
campaigners re-naming the event the “Genocide Olympics”. Editorials in the United 
States in late 2006 began declaring that ‘The Chinese leadership must be forced to make 
a choice: work now to halt genocide in Darfur, or see the Olympic Games used, at every 
turn, as a means of highlighting the Chinese role in sustaining the ultimate human crime’ 
(Sunday Boston Globe [Boston], December 17, 2006).  
Frightened by the possibility that China’s “coming out” party might be tarnished, 
Beijing embarked on a major public relations exercise to convince the world of its 
  6positive role in Sudan. This was particularly spurred on when, in April 2007 the 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Joseph Biden and 96 other 
Senators wrote a letter to Hu Jintao calling on China to use its influence to help end the 
violence in Darfur. Soon after, on May 10, 2007, the Chinese Government appointed 
Ambassador Liu Guijin as the special representative of African affairs, with a particular 
remit for Darfur. According to one Chinese informant, it was the Senate letter regarding 
Darfur and the Olympics that was the tipping point. China’s foreign policy is still 
predicated on essentially state-to-state relations and whilst the “Genocide Olympics” 
campaign remained nongovernmental it was felt it could be ignored. However, once this 
drew in legislators and the American state apparatus, Beijing felt compelled to move on 
the issue.
1 
Meanwhile, the Chinese media began to publicise claims that Beijing had played 
a constructive role in Sudan, with the Beijing Review typically declaring that ‘Since the 
Darfur issue emerged, China has been in constant communication with the relevant 
people, playing mediator, promoting dialogue between top leaders, dispatching envoys, 
discussing the problem in the UN assembly’ (Beijing Review (Beijing), June 7, 2007). 
Those involved in the Darfur issue at the diplomatic level largely saw these developments 
as positive. Certainly, Western diplomats began to assert that there had been a sea-change 
in China’s position. Thus American special envoy to Sudan, Andrew Natsios, told a 
Senate panel that China ‘have been largely supportive of our efforts to resolve the Darfur 
situation’ (State Department, 2007). The then British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett 
joined in, asserting that ‘On Sudan, I know there has been some criticism of China, but 
actually China has played really quite a positive role, particularly in the negotiation of the 
Darfur peace agreement’ (Financial Times (London), May 18, 2007).  
 
A Change in China’s Position? 
It is absolutely true that China began to publicly advise Sudan to be more “flexible” in 
accepting UN peace support personnel under the “AU/UN hybrid” proposal. And it began 
to give briefings on how much of a positive role China had been playing in Sudan. It is 
quite clear that as 2007 developed, Beijing began to be ever more sensitive of accusations 
                                                 
1 Interview with He Wenping, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China, September 18, 2007.  
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diplomats sought to move Khartoum to a more accommodatory stance on Darfur and 
outside involvement. Yet, China has at all times been hidebound by its intimate economic 
relationship with Khartoum and the billions of dollars worth of investment in Sudan, as 
well as the position that ‘China does not support bad governments. What it does is engage 
with them but does not tell them what to do’.
2 This means that Beijing is limited in the 
pressure it is able and/or willing to place on the Sudanese government. 
However, Chinese diplomacy vis-à-vis Darfur is not simply about oil (although 
that is a major part of the equation). Critics of China might like to consider that, as far as 
the Chinese are concerned, there are important principles at stake in dealing with 
Khartoum. Chinese foreign policy remains wedded to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence, formulated in 1954 and setting out the guidelines for Beijing’s foreign policy 
and its relations with other countries.
3 These Five Principles are namely, mutual respect 
for each other’s territorial integrity; non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s 
internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence (see Taylor, 1998). 
From the Chinese position, ‘human rights are something covered by the sovereignty of a 
country. A country’s sovereignty is the foremost collective human right...And 
sovereignty is the guarantor of human rights’ (Xinhua, December 12, 2005). China is a 
state generally defensive of traditional beliefs about sovereignty when events deemed by 
policymakers to be threatening Chinese interests are occurring. Certainly a belief that 
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states is vital for preserving international 
peace and stability (i.e. the Westphalian peace) has underpinned Beijing’s international 
relations and is enshrined in the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. More recently 
these principles have been updated through the “28-character guidepost” stated by Deng 
in 1989 – the so-called “New Security Concept” of China’s peaceful rise. The twenty 
eight characters were based on old Chinese sayings: “watch and analyse developments 
calmly; secure our own positions, deal with change with confidence; conceal our 
capacities; be good at keeping a low profile; never become the leader and make some 
contributions” (Zhao 1996; Teng 2007). These characters fit well with the idea of 
                                                 
2 Interview with Chinese diplomat, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 15, 2007. 
3 Interview with Acting Head, Political Affairs Section, Chinese Embassy, Windhoek, Namibia, August 13, 2006. 
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the idea of South-South cooperation and “win-win” scenarios.  
China has traditionally maintained that state sovereignty and the principle of non-
interference must serve as the basis for international relations between states, though it 
needs emphasizing that this position is not static—as Beijing’s movement on Darfur 
demonstrates. China has customarily emphasized the sovereignty of states in resolving 
issues amongst themselves also because of Beijing’s sensitivity to possible outside 
involvement in affairs perceived by China as strictly domestic matters, such as Tibet and 
Taiwan.
4 The avoidance of establishing international precedents that may be later utilized 
in attempting to deal with China’s “domestic” issues is a policy thus scrupulously 
pursued by Beijing, even though it occasionally invites cynicism from non-Chinese 
observers.  
  However, it needs emphasizing that rhetoric contained in official Chinese 
pronouncements ‘has led many observers to reach the premature conclusion that Beijing 
opposes all forms of intervention and is wedded to an antiquated approach to 
sovereignty’ (Carlson, 2006:218). In fact, it is possible to discern a subtle shift in China’s 
position regarding state sovereignty,
 5 in keeping with the flexigemony concept outlined 
above. Four official guidelines on legitimate intervention now dictate Chinese positions: 
intervention must first proceed with respect for the concerned state’s sovereignty; United 
Nations’ authorization must be gained; the invitation of the concerned state must be 
secured; and force should only ever be used when all other possible options have been 
proven ineffective (Carlson, 2004). This set of necessary conditions demonstrates that 
there has been movement in Beijing from a previous hard stand on state sovereignty and 
noninterference (Taylor, 2008). Darfur is a case in point. 
   According to UN law, the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty (which China 
has long promoted in its foreign policy) ‘shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII’ (Article 2 IV). This is a problem for Beijing, 
as Darfur exemplifies. In the post-Brahimi Report era,
6 Chinese foreign policy vis-à-vis 
peace operations has had to face a number of other thorny issues, particularly as the peace 
                                                 
4 Interview with Shu Zhan, Chinese ambassador, Asmara, Eritrea, June 29, 2006. 
5  Interview with He Wenping, CASS, Beijing, China, September 18, 2007. 
6 This report undertook a comprehensive review of UN peacekeeping operations.  
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Williams, 2004). For the Chinese, traditional peacekeeping ‘is organized and deployed 
directly by the UN with the consent of all parties’ [emphasis added] (Zhang Li, 2003: 
209). This has had implications for the China’s reactions to attempts to mediate in the 
Darfur issue and the material aspect i.e. oil is not the only explanatory variable in 
accounting for China’s policy stance regarding the ongoing crisis in Sudan (Fitzgerald 
2008b). Yet movement on the issue does reflect flexibility in Chinese foreign policy that 
many observers have previously overlooked. 
 
Chinese Flexipower and its Limits: The Zambian Case 
While Chinese engagement and investment in Sudan have attracted international 
attention, the increased Chinese footprint in Zambia has also proven to be particularly 
controversial, domestically in particular. Consequently Chinese foreign policy in Zambia 
has also seen evolution in recent years.  
Zambia’s experience with World Bank/International Monetary Fund structural 
adjustment during the 1990s was a painful and immiserating one, marked by 
deindustrialization which, according to a World Bank official, was the outcome of ‘mark 
my words, the dogma of liberalization’
7. This provided an opening for an alternative 
economic philosophy and there are now discussions of a return to (some) development 
planning in Zambia, with the publication of the Fifth National Development Plan in 2006, 
rather than a new World Bank-inspired Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
(Larmer and Fraser 2007). In part this reorientation of development policy is a response 
to public pressure over China’s role in the continent and the national division of rents 
from natural resources.  
Zambia is the third largest recipient of Chinese foreign investment in Africa and 
the nineteenth largest in the world (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 2007). China is now the world’s largest consumer of copper, and 
consequently Zambia is of significant strategic importance. There are now an estimated 
200 Chinese companies operating in Zambia (Bastholm and Kragelund 2007) and the 
Chinese government is building a US$800m multi-facility economic zone in the 
                                                 
7 Interview with World Bank official, Lusaka, January 10
th, 2007.  
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The special economic zone (SEZ) in Zambia is partly to offset criticism about the effects 
of Chinese imports on local manufacturers, although it is to be anchored by a copper 
smelter, reducing transportation costs to China. Furthermore like some of the other 
smaller “undeclared” zones in post-conflict countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, 
the zone in Zambia can take advantages of the market opportunities offered in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Certainly, the Chinese presence in conflict and post-
conflict situations around the continent grants Chinese actors first mover advantages in 
these “frontier markets” (Child and White, 2005). Consequently, the Chembe bridge 
project between Zambia and the DRC is to be constructed by a Chinese company (RoZ, 
2006) and fifty Chinese companies have pledged investments worth up to, by some 
estimates, US$900m for the SEZ (Mwanawina, 2008).  
At the same time, Chinese investment in Zambia has been highly controversial. 
Forty nine miners were killed in an explosion at the Chinese copper mine in the country 
in 2005, which operated a harsh labour regime, with miners reporting only being paid 
US$30 a month and forced to work seven day weeks (Kurlantzick 2007). The Minister of 
Southern Province reportedly wept when she saw the working conditions in the Chinese 
coal mine in Kafue (Mwanawina, 2008). The impacts of Chinese traders and the leasing 
of one of the main markets to Chinese management in the capital in Lusaka have also 
been highly contentious, as local traders are displaced. Many women traders selling 
imported second-hand clothes (saluala) find it difficult to compete with cheaper new 
Chinese imports.  
These developments came together during the 2006 election, where the main 
opposition candidate Michael Sata ran on an explicitly populist anti-Chinese platform. 
According to Sata ‘Chinese investment has not added any value to the people of Zambia’ 
and ‘we need investors, not infestors’ (quoted in Kurlantzick 2007:163 and Fitzgerald 
2008b). In fact similar sentiments had been expressed even by the minister for commerce, 
trade and industry who argued that China was “displacing local people and causing a lot 
of friction. You have Chinese laborers here moving wheelbarrows. That’s not the kind of 
investment we need. I understand they have 1.2 billion people, but they don’t have to 
send them to Africa” (Patel quoted in McGreal 2007 in Rupp 2008:72) 
  11Prior to the election the Chinese ambassador threatened to cut diplomatic relations 
if Sata won, the first time since the era of Mao that China had attempted to influence the 
outcome of an African election. Ultimately, Sata achieved a plurality of votes in the two 
regions with the greatest Chinese presence: the capital city Lusaka and the Copperbelt in 
the north of the country and when he lost the election there were anti-Chinese riots in the 
capital. In the Copperbelt there have been riots, strikes and kidnapping of Chinese 
management and the Chinese President had to cancel a planned visit to the Copperbelt in 
2007 to lay the foundation stone for a new Chinese-built national stadium for fear of the 
public reaction (Taylor 2009). However, in an effort to defuse criticism of China’s 
presence in Zambia, President HU offered Zambia $800 million in soft loans, cancelled 
$350 m of bilateral debt and announced the establishment of the special economic zone 
(Jiang 2008).  
Paradoxically it is Lusaka and the Copperbelt which have seen the most dramatic 
reductions in poverty in recent years (Carmody 2009), but there is a general feeling that 
after years of immizeration Zambians have not benefiting proportionately from the recent 
economic recovery (Negi, 2008) – a different type of resource conflict from more recent 
varieties (Le Billon 2004). This sentiment was reinforced by the closure in 2007 of  the 
Zambia-China Mulungushi Textile Joint Venture with the Chinese state (McGreal 2007). 
It couldn’t compete with Asian imports
8. This was the largest textile factory in Zambia, 
producing seventeen million metres of fabric a year, in addition to 100,000 pieces of 
clothing; employing 1,000 people directly and around 5,000 cotton growers indirectly 
(Taylor 2006). 
As the Zambian case shows, the Chinese government is not averse to using the 
threat of economic force (i.e. through cutting investment and trade relations) even in 
relatively more democratic states. However, this economic stick is also used as a carrot as 
China builds manufacturing zones, SEZs, removes tariffs on African imports etc. It can 
be averred that Beijing uses economic liberalization strategically to grant duty free “early 
harvest” arrangements for African and Southeast Asian states to the Chinese market as a 
means to offset the market’s polarizing tendencies (Glosny 2007). Given that Zambia is 
sometimes cited as “China’s Perfect Storm” (Alden 2007), the government is keen to 
                                                 
8 University of Zambia economist interview Lusaka 1/9/07.  
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monitor its investment and nationals in Africa in order to repair its image (Negi 2008). 
However, this will prove increasingly difficult given the effects of economic 
liberalization in China (Taylor 2009). Also, more unrest in Zambia looks likely as the 
effects of the global economic crisis begin to take their toll through mine closures and the 
price of maize meal (the staple food) doubled from November to December 2008 
(Anonymous 2008).  
 
The Evolution of China’s Africa Policy 
James Tang (2006: 31) has remarked that ‘as China has become more involved in regions 
where the Chinese presence formerly was limited, Beijing has encountered new 
challenges, such as the humanitarian problem in Sudan’. It might be averred that the 
strategies adopted by an incoming power, seeking to grab opportunities wherever it can, 
and those of a more established power, looking to protect its investments in an unstable 
environment, are intrinsically different and account for some of China’s recent actions. 
Equally, and this needs emphasising, Chinese corporations and the Chinese state are not 
the only actors involved with unsavoury regimes in Africa. It has long been shown that 
Western companies, with the tacit approval of their home governments, have used all 
sorts of means to craft oil deals with African regimes and have overlooked notions of 
democracy and human rights (Shaxson 2007). In some cases this is not even tacit but 
quite open.  
  Paradoxically, keeping good relationships with major Western powers is a key 
foreign policy concern for Chinese policymakers, particularly given the control which the 
US navy has worldwide of vital shipping routes (Teng 2007) – a kind of “choke space”, 
instead of the “choke points” the United States faces, in the Suez Canal for example. The 
events surrounding aspects of Chinese activities in Sudan arguably threatened this, or at 
least play into the hands of critics of China and those who like to speak of the “China 
threat”. Chinese diplomats seem aware of this, asserting that “China’s policy of non-
interference is appropriate for Beijing’s diplomacy, but China has not been very 
  13successful in explaining this to the world. Consequently, we are concerned that people 
are ‘misinterpreting’ our diplomacy”.
9  
Features of Chinese involvement in Sudan’s oil industry unquestionably fit with 
ongoing external interactions with Africa. After all, French policy towards the oil-rich 
parts of the continent—such as Gabon—has never been guided by liberty, equality and 
fraternity and other Western actors in Africa do not posses exemplary records. 
Washington’s relations with oil-rich nations such as Equatorial Guinea are not guided by 
concerns over democracy. Business, as far as many actors are concerned, is business and 
in this sense criticism of China’s oil diplomacy in Africa is somewhat hypocritical,
10 
although the scale of the genocide in Sudan does make it an exceptional case. 
This is not the whole story, however. There is a growing consensus among the 
more serious governments in Africa of where they wish the continent to be heading. Yet, 
‘While in some countries China’s involvement appears benign, in others its approach 
undercuts efforts by the African Union (AU) and Western partners to make government 
and business more transparent and accountable’ (Africa Research Bulletin, February16-
March 15, 2006: 16855). Indeed, a key concern is that some of Beijing’s activities in 
pursuit of resources threaten to reinforce patrimonial states and practices that the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union are ostensibly 
seeking to move away from (see Taylor, 2005).  
  Problems are compounded when one combines the nature of an African state such 
as Sudan with the way it is constituted through the so-called “Resource Curse”. Here, 
Chinese interest in African oil mirrors the issues that other actors have to confront. The 
broader character of the oil industry and the way it has tended to undermine democracy 
and accountability in the developing world, particularly in Africa, is longstanding. 
China’s experiences in Sudan are not particularly unique and Chinese corporations have 
had to deal with equally thorny issues in places such as Nigeria (Taylor, 2007b).  Leonard 
and Straus (2003: 13) argue that enclave economies in Africa (economies that export 
extractive products concentrated in relatively small geographic areas) are particularly 
problematic. Revenue generation is physically confined to small locales, with the prime 
                                                 
9 Interview with Chinese diplomat, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 15, 2007. 
10  Interview with Robin Sherborne, editor of Insight, Namibian political magazine, Namibia, Windhoek, August 14, 
2006. 
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general economic health of areas outside the enclave quite secondary, if not irrelevant. In 
enclave economies, then, elites gain little from any deep, growing, economic prosperity 
of the masses of the population’. Thus whilst individuals who have gained access to rents 
from such enclaves may benefit handsomely, the system fundamentally fails to promote 
wider economic growth and development. The fact that in Zambia some of the main 
perceived beneficiaries of “enclave-led growth” are Chinese has fuelled conflict there. In 
Sudan the beneficiaries are drawn almost exclusively from Northern Sudanese ethnic 
cliques detailed in the “Black Book” (El-Tom 2003). Thus, part of the problem in the 
way in which Chinese engagement with Africa is reinscribing this conflictual geography 
across regime types.  
Problematically, a distinct opaqueness in Chinese dealings in Africa compounds 
suspicions of Chinese motives, Sudan and Zambia being but two examples. As a Chinese 
scholar has noted, ‘China shoulders much of the blame, as it has been poor at making its 
energy transactions with countries such as Iran and Sudan transparent. Lack of 
transparency fuels speculation that China has a well-coordinated project for countering 
US influence’ (Zhao, 1996: 183-184). 
Yet, it is important to note that the “China Inc.” model of a Beijing advancing 
centralized strategies around the world is passé. As Downs (2007: 48) has noted with 
regard to Chinese National Oil Companies (NOCs) in Africa, ‘when it comes to choosing 
where to invest, the companies are almost always in the driver’s seat and the Chinese 
government, while occasionally offering general advice about the direction they should travel 
(for example, “invest in Morocco”), is often just along for the ride with little idea of the final 
destination. Sudan’s recent omission from the Chinese government’s catalogue of countries 
that Chinese companies are encouraged to invest in is a case in point, but this absence has not 
prevented CNPC [Chinese National Petroleum Company] from continuing to invest there’. 
Indeed as of 2003 Sudan was the country with the greatest investment in it by the CNPC 
(Yufeng 2007).  
It is important not exaggerate the capacity of the Chinese state in its ability to manage 
broad Chinese engagement with the African continent, but it would appear that Chinese 
foreign policy uses different instruments and shows different faces to different audiences: it 
is Janus-faced. For example, China is building the new Presidential Palace in Sudan, leaving 
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However, the fact that Sudan is no longer a priority country for investment will reassure 
international investor particularly after the flotation of one China’s NOCs on the New York 
stock exchange had to be withdrawn and reshaped after concerns over its investment in 
Sudan. Yet China’s stance of non-interference means that the values and interests of 
Sudan’s elites exclusively decide domestic conduct. In short, until and unless the 
Khartoum elites themselves advance transparency, pro-development policies and 
equitable growth (and are prepared to and competent enough to put them into force), no 
such course of action will be taken. Given the history of Sudan post-independence the 
prospects for this are not encouraging.  
Yet the international community, when looking at Chinese activity regarding 
energy in somewhere such as Sudan is generally preoccupied with analyzing how China 
can match its growing commercial influence with responsibility. In turn, Beijing is 
increasingly zealous in reassuring the world of its desire to be a responsible power. As 
one commentator noted, ‘The challenge is for China and other leading energy-consuming 
countries to cooperate in defining and addressing the political and social challenges that 
arise in many of the oil states of the world’ (Zhao, 1996: 183). Chinese policymakers do 
appear to be realizing this, although—as with Western policymakers—commercial 
considerations have a habit of trumping the best intentions. 
 
Conclusion 
China uses strategic levers and pressure points, including force, in its dealings with 
African states. There are ostensible soft power elements to this, such as the fact that 
China has reportedly sent 10,000 agricultural experts to Africa (Guijin 2004 cited in 
Eisenman 2007) and China Export-Import Bank is now the largest supplier of loans to the 
continent. In order to induce Chad to switch recognition away from Taipei in 2006, the 
Chinese government utilized economic and infrastructure packages, in addition to a 
commitment to reduce its support for Chad’s rebels (Eisenman, 2007). Yet, in Sudan 
Beijing has also supplied the government with weapons and built three arms factories, 
including one to assemble tanks. Cynics might state that keeping client states 
authoritarian will also keep them closer to China (Barma and Ratner 2006). 
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power point in Africa’ (quoted in Eisenman 2007). This position of influence is being 
constructed through economic global production networks, bilateral state-to-state ties and 
multilateral institutions and fora such as the Forum on China Africa Cooperation. In 
competing with the US and Europe for influence its strategy can be compared to judo: to 
flexibly exploit opponent’s strengths as weaknesses, such as the greater separation 
between Western corporations and governments, against them. Like the Chinese strategy 
game of Go, one way to win is to build relationships with small players until your rival is 
surrounded (Kurlantzick 2007). 
China is pursuing a policy of what we can think of as platform growth and 
diplomacy. It uses its seat at the high table of international relations to protect and deeper 
embed client states, such as Sudan and the diplomatic support it garners from African 
states can then be used as a platform to further protect and project its power. It is 
leveraging uneven development, using Africa and other global peripheries, as raw 
materials springboards, and the developed states as markets to fuel its economic rise. This 
ascent is cloaked in the rhetoric of ‘win-win’ and ‘South-South’ cooperation. However, 
the wins in Africa would appear to be primarily for elites and this rhetoric disguises the 
massive power inequalities between African states and China, despite the fact that 
China’s gross domestic product per capita is far below that of some African countries 
(Weiping, 2007). Nonetheless as this strategy will allow China to overtake the US as the 
world’s largest economy, by most estimates, it can be seen through the prism of what we 
have termed flexigemony.  
If US hegemony is coercion informed by consent to achieve neoliberal 
normalization, flexigemony is a more geographically differentiated strategy which varies 
the mix between these two elements more, without attracting the wrath of the hegemon. It 
more closely approximates the British policy of indirect rule which worked through 
extant institutions, although without formal juridicial control, than the hegemonic 
geopolitical model and vision born and projected during the Fordist era in the United 
States (see Rupert, 1995; Agnew, 2005). Another analogy is the tributary state system 
which used soft power to have neighbouring kingdoms emulate Chinese civilization.  
  17Deng Xiaoping famously noted that the colour of the cat does not matter, as long 
as it catches the mouse. However, his was still a historical materialist project and 
perspective (Taylor 2009). Kurlantzick (2007) notes that whole regions of the world may 
become ensnared in a mercantilist cycle where they sell raw materials in exchange for 
Chinese manufactures and in this light, African publics must be wary of being the mouse 
caught by the new cat, whatever its colour. Despite its stated policy of non-interference, 
selling arms to Sudan or Zimbabwe has dramatic implications for those countries’ 
populations and could be viewed as perhaps the most dramatic form of interference in 
internal affairs as their peoples’ struggle for democracy and a fairer sharing of their 
countries’ wealth. 
The Chinese state has been described as ruthlessly developmental. While Ramo 
(2004) argues that the Bejing Consensus opens up policy space for developing countries 
to leapfrog over their static comparative advantage into higher technology economic 
activities, in Africa there is as yet little evidence of this. Rather the Consensus appears to 
be for African state elites you can do whatever you like, as long as you are open to 
Chinese trade and investment. In its foreign policy, China arguably does not prioritise the 
responsibility to protect (R2P), but instead the responsibility to profit. In some cases T-55 
tank assembly plants serve Chinese interests, whereas multi-facility SEZs work better in 
other countries. Flexigemony is first and foremost about economics and the politics 
required to support China’s continued economic ascent.  
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